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# THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR\*

BY REAR-ADMIRAL STEPHEN B. LUCE, U.S.N. (RETIRED)

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THE preceding volume, *Diplomacy*, by the same author, was so impartial in its treatment of our relations with Spain and exhibited such an intimate knowledge of the events which led up to the war as to win the immediate approbation of the public. The present volumes, while maintaining the same high level of excellence, possess the additional merit of having been written by one who actually bore witness to, or took part in, some of the stirring events he so graphically describes.

There was little of importance in connection with the war in the Far East that was not accessible to the author: while as Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-chief of the naval forces operating against Cuba all the official correspondence relating to the movements of the fleet came under his immediate supervision. To this must be added untiring industry in consulting authorities and a conscientious regard for accuracy of statement.

The author was fortunate in having for his guidance throughout the work the testimony of witnesses on both sides of the war; witnesses who took leading parts in the battles and who subsequently gave out for publication full and graphic accounts of the incidents in both engagements as they came under their own personal observation. Some of these accounts read like pages of romance; and the treatment of the brave unfortunates who fell into the hands of their noble-hearted captors would add luster to the brightest days of chivalry. Very great pains has been taken to sift the mass of evidence and wherever possible to reconcile ap-

\* *The Relations of the United States and Spain—Diplomacy. The Spanish-American War.* 2 vols. By Rear-Admiral F. E. Chadwick, U.S.N. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

parent discrepancies. With these manifold advantages and exceptional qualifications the author was well equipped for the task of writing an authoritative history of our war with Spain. He has produced what will be accepted as a standard work on the subject.

It is not our present purpose to review the entire work, but rather to confine ourselves to the main incidents of the story—namely, the battle of Manila Bay and the battle of Santiago de Cuba: the one beginning the war, the other ending it as far as the navy was concerned.

The battle of Manila Bay is very fully described. On Sunday, April 24th, Commodore (now Admiral) Dewey, then at Hongkong, was informed by the Hongkong authorities that as war had begun and Great Britain was a neutral, his squadron must within twenty-four hours move out of British jurisdiction. Commodore Dewey informed the Government at Washington of this fact in a despatch dated Hongkong, April 25, 1898. This despatch was received at the Navy Department April 24th. The apparent discrepancy in dates is explained by the author:

“Manila is in 121° east of Greenwich, or 196° east of Washington. Its time is thus thirteen hours earlier than Washington time. At 11 A.M. of, say, April 21st it is but noon of the Washington 20th.”

This explanation must be kept in mind.

At 2 P.M. the 24th the *Boston*, *Concord*, and *Petrel* left Hongkong accompanied by the revenue cutter *McCulloch* and two store-ships for Mirs Bay, thirty miles east of Hongkong on the Chinese coast. At 9 A.M., April 25th, the time limit having expired, the *Olympia*, *Baltimore*, and *Raleigh* “left Hongkong, cheered to the echo as they steamed from the harbor by the British soldiers and sailors ashore and afloat.”

The revenue cutter *McCulloch*, regarded as a non-combatant, was sent to Hongkong for news. She returned Tuesday, April 26th, bearing the following despatch:

“WASHINGTON, April 24.

“War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.”

It is well understood that this despatch was dictated by President McKinley himself.

The immediate result of these instructions was the despatch from Commodore Dewey

“MANILA, May 1, 1898.

“The squadron arrived at daybreak this morning; immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: *Reina Cristina, Castilla, Antonio de Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, Marques del Duero, El Correo, Velasco*, one transport, *Isla de Mindanao*, water battery at Cavité. I shall destroy Cavité arsenal dispensatory. The squadron is uninjured; *few men were slightly wounded*. I request the Department will send immediately from San Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. The only means of telegraphing is to American Consul at Hongkong.”

It is certainly extraordinary that no one was killed on the American side. The casualties on the Spanish side were: killed, 167; wounded, 214; total, 381. It was a “military execution,” says one high authority. But had the gunnery of the Spaniards been anything but execrable they (the Spaniards) would have been the executioners. What, then, would have been the position of Commodore Dewey with no base for his shattered squadron to fall back upon? The risks he took were enormous, but fully justified by the result. This point has not been sufficiently considered by the critics.

May 7th, on the receipt of Commodore Dewey's telegram, President McKinley thanked the Commodore, his officers, and men in the name of the American people for their “splendid achievement and overwhelming victory” and gave him the rank of rear-admiral. May 10th Rear-Admiral Dewey received the thanks of Congress, was later raised to the rank of Admiral of the Navy, and his Chief of Staff, flag lieutenant, and commanding officers were, on his recommendation, advanced in rank.

The naval battle of Santiago de Cuba is graphically described. Many interesting, not to say highly exciting details, are given. Excerpts are out of the question. The story must be read to be appreciated. The author wisely confines himself to the time of the war without concerning himself with the aftermath. With commendable judgment he abstains from any reference to the unfortunate and senseless controversy started and kept alive by the press of a later day as to who was commander-in-chief of the American naval forces during the battle. He assumes quite naturally, and correctly, that there could not possibly be any question on that point. And there was no such question. It is made

clear that the officer commanding in chief before the battle, during the battle, and after the battle was the one indicated by the flag. The flag of the Commander-in-chief, Rear-Admiral Sampson, was borne throughout the battle by the *New York*. It is true that at the call of duty that ship had temporarily vacated her accustomed station, but the first gun of the engagement was the signal for her return. This fact alone, were others wanting, shows conclusively that the *New York* was at the opening of the fight within easy signal distance and, therefore, well within the field of the conflict.

Although the author nowhere even so much as hints, as we have already stated, that there is, or ever was, a question as to who was in actual command of the fleet during the battle, yet, unfortunately, three years after the war in an official document of no little importance a different view prevailed. During the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry in the case of Rear-Admiral Winfield Scott Schley, U.S.N., all testimony on the question of who was in command of the fleet during the battle was rigorously excluded. That question was not before the court, and the court emphatically refused to consider it or to hear evidence with regard to it. And yet, notwithstanding this decision of the court, the Judge-Advocate, in his summing up of the evidence, goes out of his way to discredit the commander-in-chief and deprive him of the tribute of victory which was his just due. It was only a "captains' fight," he told the court. He thus, through the published report of the proceedings of the court, misled public opinion to the injury of the professional standing of an officer of quite exceptional merit.

In his argument before the court the Judge-Advocate said:

*"I submit that the evidence shows that it was a captains' fight, and, without disparagement of Commodore Schley's personal conduct on that occasion, that there was no such concerted action of the vessels engaged as to indicate their control by any one person. All evidently strove to do their utmost, and thus was accomplished one of the grandest naval victories ever won." \**

From this language it appears that the Judge-Advocate was of the opinion that the force blockading Santiago had suddenly become disorganized and that on the appearance of the Spanish ships each American captain acted on his own

\* Record of proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in the case of Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, U.S.N., 1901. Vol II, page 1821.

initiative, independently of all others, and scrambled pell-mell into the fight.\*

It is more than doubtful if the views of the Judge-Advocate, himself a naval officer, had any influence with the court. The unfortunate part of it is that those views, unsupported as they were by the evidence, have been accepted by the public as authentic.

With rare good taste the author of the work before us does not attempt to deal with the published statements above quoted. He tells his story calmly and, although an actor in the drama, impersonally. He gathers his facts from unimpeachable sources, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions. And yet there stands the record of the court to confound the historian of the future even as it has confused the public of the present day. In the interests of history that record must be corrected and made to conform to the facts. What are the facts in this connection?

It can be shown from the work before us, *first*, that it was *not* a "captains' fight" as that phrase is generally understood. *Secondly*, that there *was* "such concerted action of the vessels engaged as to indicate their control by any one person." *Thirdly*, that it was *not* "one of the grandest naval victories ever won." The third clause may be dismissed at once as far too extravagant to merit a moment's consideration. Let us pause here for a brief space while we endeavor to find out the meaning of the term "a captains' fight."

Every sea fight is in a certain sense a "captains' fight," inasmuch as in battle each captain fights, or commands, his own ship and directs her movements. The expression is admissible only in single ship actions, such as that of the *Constitution* and the *Guerrière*, during the War of 1812, inasmuch as each captain has then the sole and absolute control of his own ship. But when it comes to an aggregation of ships, as in a fleet or squadron, such independence of action ceases in a great measure to exist. The movements

\* Curiously the Judge-Advocate refutes his own argument. He continues: "Of course the vessels stood in toward the harbor entrance when it was discovered that the enemy's vessels were making a sortie. Such was not only their *prescribed duty*, but their natural and proper course." By whom was this duty *prescribed*? By the commander-in-chief in his orders of June 2d. Hence there *was* "concerted action indicating control by one person."

of each ship in this case come under the control of the one who commands in chief. And although each captain continues to command his own individual ship, yet as a component part of the fleet he is, and must necessarily be, subject to superior authority. Otherwise a fleet would be a mere assemblage of ships without coherence and without the organization and discipline essential to success in battle.

It is this subordination of the individual and the synchronous movements of the several units in obedience to one controlling will that constitutes naval tactics. Such being the case, all responsibility for the management of the fleet centers in one person—the commander-in-chief. It cannot in the very nature of things be otherwise.

The expression “a captains’ fight” is an adaptation of the term “a soldiers’ fight.” A soldiers’ fight is one in which the troops, carried away by their ardor, get beyond the control of their officers and execute of their own volition movements not contemplated in the original plan of battle. At Molwitz the great Frederick gave up the battle as lost and sought safety in flight. He owed his success to the valor of his troops, who fought while he was fleeing. It was his first battle. At Chattanooga (November 25th, 1863) the battle was opened by Sherman’s attack on the left. To relieve the forces concentrating upon him, Thomas in the center charged up Missionary Ridge. His troops, once started, could not be restrained. They not only drove the enemy from their rifle trenches, but followed them up the hill, carried the works on the crest of the ridge, and routed the defenders, pursuing them until dark and capturing many prisoners. The Confederates in front of Sherman, now unsupported, also retreated. This phase of the battle was essentially a “soldiers’ fight,” and the splendid victory was due in a very large measure to the character of the troops. But when we come to inquire why those troops were in that particular place at that particular time we find there was a highly intelligent directive force behind them. They were not stragglers; they were not there by accident, but in conformity to a carefully thought-out, prearranged plan of battle. A soldiers’ fight is possible when they have been well placed by superior authority. The analogy is very much strained, however, that would seek to apply that method of warfare to a fleet fight.

All the great naval battles of which history gives an ac-

count where the results have been decisive have been in a certain remote sense "captains' fights." There are exceptions, it is true, which will readily occur to every reader of naval history, but these have been almost invariably what are called drawn battles. Take, for example, the engagement of Ushant, July 27th, 1778, where the English, under Admiral the Hon. Augustus Keppel, with thirty sail of the line, were opposed by a like number of the French under the Comte d'Orvilliers. This was not a captains' fight, as no general engagement was brought on. In this case admiral was pitted against admiral; and as the French Admiral d'Orvilliers afterward remarked, "I outmanœuvered Mr. Keppel." Insignificant as this engagement was from a military point of view, it has yet held a prominent place in history as showing that professional jealousies are not altogether unknown to the naval service. On their return to home waters the second in command of the English fleet, Sir Hugh Palliser, started a bitter controversy which "set all England by the ears." Admiral Keppel was brought before a court-martial and acquitted of all charges. The conduct of Sir Hugh Palliser was also inquired into. The court found his conduct during the battle highly exemplary in many instances, but "reprehensible" in others.\*

A conspicuous case of a "captains' fight," if one may use that vacuous term, is that fought off Cape St. Vincent when Nelson in the *Captain*, 74 guns, committed a "breach of discipline" by leaving his station in the fleet without orders and cutting off the retreating Spaniards. He was followed by Troubridge in the *Culloden*, 74 guns, also without orders, and this was the turning-point of the battle. Captain Collingwood, of the *Excellent*, wrote subsequently: "The highest rewards are due you" (Nelson) "and the *Culloden*; you formed the plan of attack—we were only accessories to the Don's ruin." A "captains' fight" or not, the Commander-in-chief, Admiral Sir John Jarvis, received the sole credit and was rewarded for that victory by an earldom and a pension of three thousand pounds a year, and was known thereafter as the Earl of St. Vincent. The English Admiralty knew its business.

At the Nile the plan of battle was Nelson's. But he left the details to be worked out by his captains. Says the historian Admiral Mahan:

\* *The Royal Navy*. By Sir William Laird Clowes. Vol. III, page 412.



"It is in perfect keeping with Nelson's character that after ascertaining that his captains understood his views he should, with perfect confidence, have left all the details of immediate action with them."

In fact, Fenimore Cooper repeats the tradition that the whole tactical combination at the Nile was attributed to the captains. Whatever the truth of this may be, there is no doubt that the movement by which the head of the French column was doubled on and their inshore batteries engaged was due solely and entirely to Captain Foley of the *Goliath* and the captains who followed his lead in the *Zealous*, *Orion*, and *Theseus*. And this credit may be accorded Captain Foley, as the historian remarks, "without stripping one leaf from Nelson's laurels." After Nelson was severely wounded and carried below, the battle was continued in accordance with the original plan with unwonted fury, and, as Lord Howe said, "the victory was unparalleled in this respect, that every captain distinguished himself." Nelson in the cockpit might just as well have been miles away. Here surely, if anywhere, is an example of a "captains' fight." But it has been reserved for the present day to coin the expression.

And so at Trafalgar: Nelson, knowing full well that in battle signals were futile, stated in his Memorandum of October 9th, 1805, the broad principle that:

"In case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy."

It is an ancient precept that the commander-in-chief of a fleet should make his plan of battle known to his captains in order that, battle once joined, signals may be unnecessary. Such was Nelson's practice and such was the course pursued by Rear-Admiral Sampson, the Commander-in-chief of the fleet blockading Santiago de Cuba, as we shall presently show.

Of the memorable order above referred to, the historian remarks, as in the case of the plan of the battle of the Nile, that it was not only remarkable for its sagacity, "but even more for the magnanimous confidence with which the details of execution were freely intrusted to those upon whom they had to fall"—the captains.

After Collingwood (leading the lee column in the *Royal Sovereign*) had succeeded in breaking through the allied lines, everything depended upon the discretion of each cap-

tain in availing himself of the conditions as he came up, but following out Nelson's general injunction that their effort should be toward the enemy's rear. Following Collingwood's flag came the *Belleisle*, 80 guns, Captain William Hargood. It was just noon when she reached the French line. The master earnestly asked the captain, "Shall we go through, sir?" "Go through, by —," was the energetic reply. "There's your ship, sir; place me alongside of her." Neither Nelson nor Collingwood ordered Captain Hargood to "go through." He acted on his own responsibility in carrying out the original plan of battle. Clearly it was only a "captains' fight," this great battle of Trafalgar.

Captain Codrington, of the *Orion*, narrates that "we all scrambled into battle as soon as we could. I was in the middle of it before I fired a gun." Many such incidents are to be found in the full account of the battle, showing how each and every captain in the smoke and din of the fight was thrown entirely upon his own resources, but with the Memorandum for his guide. Inextricable confusion for a while prevailed. Signals were useless. Surely it was only a "captains' fight." And yet what a fight!

The *Victory*, bearing Nelson's flag, crossed the wake of the *Bucentaur* at 1 P.M. At 1.30 P.M. Nelson fell mortally wounded and was borne below to the cockpit, where he died. Will any one say that the battle thereafter, which ended at 4.30 under Collingwood, raged with less fury or not on the original plan? Did any sane Briton ever accord the meed of victory to Collingwood! Says an eminent French naval officer in this connection:

"That the principles of the Memorandum (Nelson's order of October 9th, 1805) were faithfully and wholly carried out is a matter of quite secondary importance; its author might have died at the very beginning of the battle; he had breathed into the minds and into the very souls of his captains the principles and elements of victory; thenceforth victory was assured, and, despite his untimely exit from the field, it was Nelson who won the battle of Trafalgar, not Collingwood." \*

In each and all of these great battles the victorious fleet was dominated by the genius of the commander-in-chief. He infused his spirit in all from captain to powder-boy. They all knew under whose eye they fought. Napoleon's presence on the field of battle was worth a *corps d'armée*;

\* *War on the Sea*. By Captain Darrieus, French Navy. Translated by Philip R. Alger, U.S.N. Page 80.

Nelson's name alone assured victory. Of a bold Scottish chief 'twas said, "One blast upon his bugle-horn were worth a thousand men." In all times, ancient and modern, whatever may have been the motive power, whether oars, sails, or steam, a great moral force has carried the fleet to victory. The personality of the commander-in-chief is always a factor that must be reckoned with.

But whether the expression a "captains' fight" is a mere meaningless term or not, certainly the battle of Santiago de Cuba, July 3d, 1898, deserves to be so characterized less than any naval battle of which history gives an account.

The author of the work before us makes it perfectly clear that the military problem was one of the simplest kind and may be stated in a few words: It was to starve out, or whip, an inferior force.

The commander-in-chief had made all his dispositions for battle long in advance. Each ship had her allotted station; each captain understood perfectly well his plain duty. The appearance of the enemy was the signal for battle. No other signal was necessary. When the Spanish ships were clear of the entrance of the harbor each captain of the blockading squadron knew exactly what to do, and he did his part even as the English captains at the Nile and at Trafalgar did their parts; and as far as signals directing their movements were concerned, the commander-in-chief might just as well have been lying in the cockpit mortally wounded. He had done his whole duty long in advance. He had closed the signal-book, even as Nelson closed the signal-book at Trafalgar and Lord Howe on the "glorious 1st of June." There was no *mêlée*, as in the great sea fights named, when captains were thrown upon their own resources. *It was simply a superior force in the open chasing and destroying, in accordance with a pre-arranged plan, a flying and demoralized foe.* The blockading squadron had been organized and prepared for that very purpose, and when the hour came the plans and purposes of the commander-in-chief were carried out, each captain performing his allotted part as he had been instructed to do. The general order of June 2d runs:

"If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run on shore." This order was carried out in a very literal sense thirty-one days later: all the Spanish ships were "forced to run on shore," as the author relates.

In the general order of June 21st for landing the troops by the navy the commander-in-chief said:

"The attention of Commanding Officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish Admiral ever intends to attempt to escape, that attempt will be made soon."

These two general orders were carried out to the letter. There is overwhelming evidence on this point.

The Judge-Advocate has already informed us that

"on the appearance of the enemy our ships stood in for the entrance of the harbor in accordance with their prescribed duty."

In his modest but graphic account of the fight the gallant and lamented Rear-Admiral Philip wrote:

"The battle was a direct consequence of the blockade, and upon the method and effectiveness of the blockade was very largely dependent the issue of the battle. It was necessary to have always before the entrance of Santiago Harbor a force of ships amply sufficient to cope with the Spanish squadron, should it come out to do battle; and it was necessary to have this force so disposed that none of the Spaniards could escape, if that were their object, no matter what direction they should take. Unremitting vigilance by night and by day was an absolute necessity; . . . the blockade was conducted with a success exemplified by the result. It was a terrible strain, that month of watching for what no man knew. . . . So when the Spanish Admiral at last made his dash to escape we were ready—ready with our men, with our guns, and with our engines. . . . Before he (Admiral Cervera) had fairly found himself outside the Morro the entire blockading squadron was pumping shell into him at such a rate as virtually to decide the issue of the battle in the first few moments."

In his despatch to the Navy Department of July 10th, 1898, Commodore Schley said:

"Feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts of July 6th have attributed victory of July 3d almost entirely to me. Victory was secured by the force under the Commander-in-chief North Atlantic Squadron, and to him the honor is due."

The testimony of all the captains was to the same end, showing clearly that there *was* "concerted action on the part of the vessels engaged, indicating their control by one person"—namely, that of the commander-in-chief. H. W. Wilson, the well-known English writer, in his *Downfall of Spain*, said:

"Admiral Sampson from first to last did his work in a manner that commands British admiration."

That long and tedious blockade, maintained with such unrelaxing vigor, and the victory which was the fruit of that exacting labor, were due to one controlling mind—and but one. To deny such a palpable truth one might as well shatter the Duilian Column in Rome and tear down the Memorial Column in Trafalgar Square, London, as libels on history.

A total absence of glorification over the issue of the battle is a refreshing feature of the narrative. The victory is ascribed to the superiority of the Americans in numbers of ships and weight of metal. The figures are given in the same impersonal and matter-of-fact style as statistics recorded by the Census Bureau in Washington. The author informs us that:

“The result was only what could have been expected from the superiority of the Americans in numbers, armor, and armament, but, above all, in practice and preparedness. . . . There were six heavy ships against four; fourteen 12 and 13 inch guns against six 11-inch; thirty 8-inch against none on the Spanish side of that caliber; forty-four 6-inch, 5-inch, and 4-inch against thirty-six 5.5 and 4.7 inch; ninety-six 6-pounders against thirty-eight Spanish.

“The superiority of the American ships in armor is equally obvious. The only superiority of the Spanish ships was in their speed, which, however, availed naught through bad coal, foul bottoms, their quick destruction by fire, and, in the case of the *Colon*, through inability to make what she should have made, probably through want of training of her fire-room force.”—Vol. II, page 184.

With these figures the author leaves to the reader the privilege of magnifying the battle at his pleasure.

But in whatever terms the victory may be characterized, the results were certainly momentous and far-reaching. They are well expressed in the pathetic words of the gallant but unfortunate Captain (now Admiral) Concas of the *Maria Teresa* and Chief of Staff. We give the entire passage as too interesting to abridge. It is of the *sortie* of Cervera he speaks:

“With the battle-flag hoisted, the *Infanta Maria Teresa* advanced ahead of the other cruisers, which for the last time gave the honors due their Admiral, saluting him with hurrahs that manifested the spirit of the crews worthy of a better fate. The *Maria Teresa* continued to advance rapidly without being detected until she was abreast the Estrella battery; signals, evidently hurried, and an alarm gun from the *Iowa* showed that the hostile ships were taking position for battle.

“We had just finished making the turn at Diamond Bank amidst death-

like silence, everybody awed by the magnificent spectacle of the ships issuing from the narrow passage between the Morro and Socapa. It was a solemn moment capable of making the calmest heart beat faster. From outside the conning-tower, which I did not want to enter, in order, if I should fall, to set an example to my defenseless crew, I asked leave of the Admiral, and with that gave the order to fire. The bugle gave the signal to begin the battle, an order repeated by those of all the batteries and followed by a murmur of approbation from all those poor sailors and marines who were anxious to fight, for they did not know that these war-like echoes were the signal which hurled their country at the feet of the victor, since they were to deprive Spain of the only power still of value to her, without which a million soldiers could do nothing to serve her; of the only power which could have weight in a treaty of peace; a power which, once destroyed, would leave Spain, the old Spain of Europe, not Cuba, as so many ignorant persons believed, completely at the mercy of the enemy.

"My bugles were the last echo of those which history tells were sounded in the taking of Grenada; it was the signal that the history of four centuries of greatness was ended and that Spain had passed into a nation of the fourth class.

"'Poor Spain,' I said to my beloved and noble Admiral, and he answered by an expressive motion, as though to say he had done everything to avoid it and that his conscience was clear.

"As for myself, what a strange coincidence. It had been but a few years when the honor had fallen to me to represent in the archaic caravel an exact copy of that of Columbus\* all the glories of the fifteenth century, and on the 3d of July it fell to me to give the signal for the end of that greatness. But the first was a representation, and this was the dreadful reality.

"The second gun of the deck battery was the first to open fire and brought us back to this reality, too dreadful to allow us to think of other things. Giving the cruiser all her speed, we poured out a frantic fire with our whole battery except the forward gun, which we reserved to fire at close quarters."

The battle practically terminated the war and Spain's colonial empire at the same time. The bald facts are that the war began with Admiral Dewey's victory of Manila Bay, May 1st, 1898, and was ended in sixty-four days by Rear-Admiral Sampson's victory of Santiago de Cuba July 3d, 1898. Such, it is safe to say, will be the verdict of an intelligent public on reading this instructive history of the war by one exceptionally well qualified to write it.

The smoke of battle having blown away, the field was left clear for the exercise of diplomacy. The very full account

\* The *Santa Maria*, a reproduction of the flag-ship of Columbus, was brought over to this country, under her own sail, by Commander (now Admiral) Concas and taken to the World's Fair, Chicago, in 1892, where she attracted much attention.

of the treaty of peace and of the negotiations which preceded it will be found one of the most interesting chapters of the book.

The attitude of the Government on this occasion was one of firmness and dignity so becoming to a great nation. The President in his instructions to the American commissioners for the treaty of peace said :

"It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action. The luster and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not, under any illusion of the hour, be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths. It is believed that the true glory and the enduring interests of the country will most surely be served if an unselfish duty conscientiously accepted and a signal triumph honorably achieved shall be crowned by such an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory as best comports with the traditions and character of our enlightened republic.

"The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that requirement, we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history to say that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and near our own territory that the Spanish flag should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere.

"The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization."

This is an amplification of "manifest destiny." But the question of the Philippines was not so easily settled. After much interesting discussion, a full account of which the author has given us, the United States Government was led to concede that our demand for those islands could not "be based on conquest." After further negotiations it was finally agreed to pay twenty million dollars for them. The author

makes it perfectly clear that we did not "conquer the Philippines and then buy them," as many have vainly imagined.

In conclusion the author informs us that "the treaty was approved by the United States Senate on February 6, 1899, ratified by the President on the same day, and by the Queen Regent of Spain on March 19th. The ratifications were exchanged at Washington on April 11, 1899, and the treaty proclaimed the same day, thus bringing a peace which all well-wishers to the two countries must hope may never be broken."

We here take our leave of this very valuable addition to the literature of the Spanish-American War. While commending it to the attention of the reading public, we avail ourselves of the opportunity of supplying the sequel: Not the least remarkable page in the story of the battle of Santiago de Cuba is the one giving the manner in which the two commanders-in-chief were treated by their respective Governments. It was the vanquished alone who was honored. With steadfast courage Rear-Admiral Cervera went out to meet the fate he had clearly foreseen and plainly foretold. He did what he could; and his country recognized his self-sacrificing devotion to duty. On his return to Spain he was made a Vice-Admiral, a Senator for life, and Chief of the General Staff of the Spanish navy.

We reversed the custom, hallowed by immemorial time, of doing honor to the victor. His services received no public recognition. Said the Hon. John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy during the war:

"It is a tragic feature of the struggle with Spain that Sampson, broken by the tremendous strain he had undergone, died without receiving the recognition to which his patriotic and splendid service entitled him and without even the thanks of Congress or promotion in rank."

The country he served so well paid him no mark of honor, expressed no sense of gratitude. He was the victim of a controversy for which he was in no way responsible and in which he took no part, and yet the rancor of it brought on his head the cruellest abuse and vituperation. Even his household was not exempt.

"The controversy became exceedingly bitter and personal, raging more in the press and in public discussions than in naval circles. Scurrilous verses and cartoons appeared in the press holding him up to public con-



tempt, as if he had been a traitor instead of a patriot. All this he bore in silence and with characteristic fortitude." \*

The State of New Jersey presented him with a sword, and Harvard and Yale each honored him with the degree of LL.D. But the country to whose interests he was so devoted gave no sign of its appreciation of his worth.

A few naval officers, his personal friends, who had been closely associated with him during the war, in order to testify their affection and respect, placed a beautiful memorial window in the chapel of the Naval Academy dedicated to his memory. On the unveiling of the window eulogistic addresses were delivered setting forth his high character as an officer and as a man and the eminent services he had rendered his country. In speaking of the trying events of the war, one who knew him well said: "Disregardful of all but the necessity of success, he was heedless of personal danger and daring in professional risk." Another tribute by one who also knew him well and had been closely associated with him during the war was: "Sampson's courage was of the highest and finest type, the kind which sinks all thought of person in the sense of duty. If he had any sense of fear for what might happen to himself, it never appeared in even the remotest suggestion." Indeed, all who knew him most intimately agreed in saying he was absolutely devoid of personal fear, and yet a United States Senator from his place in the Senate Chamber stigmatized him as an "arrant coward." † The credit for the victory he won was given to others. It was only a "captains' fight" they said. And America flung the victor's laurels to the winds.

STEPHEN B. LUCE.

\* *The New American Navy*, by Hon. John D. Long.

† *Congressional Record*, February 26th, 1901. Page 3036.